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Recent empirical findings by Elsas (2005) and Degryse and Ongena (2007) document a U-
shaped effect of market concentration on relationship lending which cannot be easily 
accommodated by the investment and strategic theories of relationship lending. In this paper, 
we suggest that this non-monotonicity can be explained by looking at the organizational 
structure of local credit markets. We provide evidence that marginal increases in interbank 
competition are detrimental to relationship lending in markets where large and out-of-market 
banks are predominant. On the contrary, where relational-based lending technologies are al-
ready widely in use in the market by a large group of small mutual banks, an increase in 
competition may drive banks to further cultivate their extensive ties with customers. 
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Even if the banking industry is going global, relationship lending is still perceived as an
essential feature of small business nance, not only in the European or Japanese bank-
based system, but also in market-oriented systems, such as the US. The bulk of the
literature focuses on the eects of exclusive bank-rm ties on lending conditions, while
relatively few contributions have investigated what inuences relationship lending, and
particularly how credit market competition aects bank orientation (transactional versus
relational lending)1.
On the theoretical level, the eect of competition on bank orientation is ambiguous.
For those who emphasize the investment nature of relationship lending it is natural to
argue that competition and relational lending are die-hard foes. Market power is a neces-
sary condition for banks to extract the informational rent generated by investing specic
resources in the relationship with borrowers (Mayer, 1988; Rajan, 1992; Petersen and
Rajan, 1995; Ogura, 2010). By contrast, for those who consider the strategic nature of
relationship lending, competition and relational lending may be proved to be friends.
Fierce competition from out-of-market banks (or in the arm's length market) may steer
local banks to orientate their activities towards small, proximate and informationally
opaque borrowers, boosting relational lending. In this way they can create a competitive
edge that helps insulate themselves from pure price competition of outside banks (Boot
and Thakor, 2000; Yafeh and Yosha, 2001; Dell'Ariccia and Marquez, 2004; Hauswald
and Marquez, 2006).
The empirical evidence is mixed, with some studies nding a positive association be-
tween interbank competion and relationship lending (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Fischer,
2000; Ogura, 2007, 2010), while others nding the opposite or no correlation between
the two phenomena (Memmel et al., 2007; Neuberger et al., 2008). No studies, however,
investigates the possibility that interbank competition has heterogeneous eects on rela-
tionship lending, depending on the structure of the local credit market. Inuential steps
in this direction were recently made by Elsas (2005) and Degryse and Ongena (2007),
who explicitly allow for non-monotonic eects of market concentration on the likelihood
of close bank-rm ties, by uncovering the existence of a U-shaped relationship. How-
ever, neither the investment nor the strategic theory of relationship lending predicts a
U-shaped eect of market concentration (or competition) on the relational orientation of
banks2. Moreover, Elsas (2005) and Degryse and Ongena (2007) fail to devise a complete
explanation of why the strategic theory of relationship lending would hold for poorly
concentrated market while the investment theory would hold for highly concentrated
markets.
In this paper, we suggest that the non-monotonic eect of market concentration on
relationship lending is not due to the degree of concentration per se, but to the interplay
between market concentration and the type of competitors operating in the local credit
market. More precisely, our research hypothesis is that what prevails between the in-
1Degryse and Ongena (2008) and Strahan (2008) provides reviews of the literature on interbank
competition, bank structure and lending policy
2On the contrary, the models developed by Dinc (2000) and Yafeh and Yosha (2001) predict that
banks' investments in relationship lending reach their maximum with an intermediate number of banks
and an intermediate level of competition.
2vestment and the strategic theories of relationship lending depends on the organizational
structure of the local banking system. When the credit market is dominated by highly
hierarchical (large and functionally distant3) banks, market concentration favors close
and extensive bank-rm ties. On the contrary, when the majority of branches belong to
small, non-hierarchical local banks, it is stronger interbank competition (i.e., lower mar-
ket concentration) which promotes relationship lending. The intuition for this conjecture
is simple and has to do with the comparative advantages hierarchical and non-hierarchical
banks can exploit when competition is tough (Berger and Udell, 2006). The former type of
institution has a comparative advantage in transaction-oriented lending technologies, like
nancial statement lending, credit scoring or asset-based lending, due to scale economies
in collecting, processing and assessing hard information, while it is disadvantaged at re-
lationship lending due to organizational diseconomies in dealing with soft information.
For opposite reasons, small institutions with few layers of management are comparatively
advantaged at using subjective and non-codied information and establishing close lend-
ing relationships with information-intensive borrowers. In this view, greater interbank
competition should encourage or discourage the use of relational-oriented technologies
depending on the type of lending institution which predominates in the local market.
In what follows, we provide evidence for a large sample of small and medium sized
Italian manufacturing rms, consistent with our hypothesis reconciling the investment
and the strategic theories of relationship lending. Once we introduce in a regression
model of relationship lending the interaction terms between market concentration and
dierent measures of size, localism and distance of locally-operating bank branches, the
U-shaped eect of HHI vanishes, while the non-linear eect of competition is driven by
the organizational structure of the local banking system: competition and relationship
lending are friends or foes according to who are the major competitors, small cooperative
banks or large and distant banks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the
theory laying behind the interplay of competition and organizational structure of banking
systems in shaping bank-rm relationships. In Section 3, we describe our dataset, the
estimation methodology and the variables. In Sections 4 and 5, we discuss the econometric
results for the basic model and various robustness exercises. Finally, in Section 6 we draw
some concluding remarks.
2 Bank competition, organization and orientation:
background theory and evidence
2.1 How does bank competition aect bank orientation?
Interbank competition may have positive or negative inuence on the relational orien-
tation of banks according to the motives leading banks to form close relationships with
borrowers.
Investing resources in a credit relationship, banks may aim at acquiring private infor-
mation on the borrower and the opportunity to extract future prots from lending. In
3By functional distance, we mean the distance between local branches (or subsidiaries) and the deci-
sional centre (typically the headquarter) of their parent bank (Alessandrini et al., 2005).
3this case, if information acquisition is costly and takes time, harsher competition in the
local credit market increases the likelihood of the borrower switching to another bank
before the benets from information production materialize, and makes lending relation-
ships less valuable to banks and rms which are forced to write contracts that break even
on a period-by-period basis (Mayer, 1988; Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Ogura, 2010). In
addition, competition exacerbates the winner's curse eect, further weakening the banks'
ex-ante eort to screen borrowers and build close lending relationships (Cao and Shi,
2000). Therefore, the empirical prediction of the investment theory of relationship lend-
ing is that extensive bank-rm ties and relational-based lending to small businesses are
more frequent when the local credit market is more concentrated, regardless of the type
of locally-operating banks4.
In addition to extracting rents from borrowers, when banks and lending technologies
are not homogeneous, banks may engage in relationship lending strategically. For in-
stance, Boot and Thakor (2000) show that banks may decide to lend on a relational basis
in order to create a competitive edge with respect to their rivals and insulate themselves
from pure price competition. Yafeh and Yosha (2001) show that a greater competition in
the arm's length market induces multi-product banks to engage more (less) in relationship
lending if the number of active banks is suciently small (large). In addition they show
that incumbent multi-product banks may strategically increase investment in relation-
ship lending in order to reduce the demand and prots in the arm's length market and
discourage the entry of a new competitor in this market. In a similar vein, Dell'Ariccia
and Marquez (2004) and Hauswald and Marquez (2006) nd that greater competition
from out-of-market banks generates an increase in relationship lending on the part of
local banks. Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2004) develop a model in which a local lender
has better information on borrowers than outside lenders, but potentially faces higher
costs in extending a loan. In this framework, the informed lender has some degree of
market power which allows him/her to informationally capture local borrowers. Hence,
ercer outside competition leads local lenders to reallocate more resources to the sectors
most aected by adverse selection problems, leading to a ight to captivity. Hauswald and
Marquez (2006) endogenize the production of information and stress the role of the bank-
borrower distance, which reduces the quality of the creditworthiness signal. Given that
banks acquire proprietary information on borrowers to soften lending competition and
increase their market share, harsher competition decreases banks' incentive to generate
private information, leading to reallocation of the loan portfolio towards more proximate
borrowers.
The applied literature on the eects of interbank competition on bank orientation is
somewhat limited and inconclusive. Empirical support for the investment theory of rela-
tionship lending is provided, for example, by Petersen and Rajan (1995), Fischer (2000)
and recently by Ogura (2007, 2010). The former, using data on US small rms, found
that young rms in concentrated markets receive more credit and pay lower interest rates
than similar rms in competitive markets, with these dierences vanishing as rms get
older. In a similar vein, Ogura (2010) found that inside banks in the USA (banks hold-
4A partial exception is Vesala (2005) who shows that the absolute benets from being an inside bank
have a U-shaped relationship with switching costs, considered an inverse measure of market competition.
However, Vesala also shows that the relative benets from being an inside rather than an outside bank
monotonically increases with switching costs.
4ing the majority of a rm's total checking account balances for more than one year) are
willing to charge lower interest rates to young rms only if they operate in concentrated
credit markets, thereby having the opportunity to establish an informational advantage
over rivals. Such ndings were broadly conrmed by Fischer (2000) for the German case,
suggesting that competitive pressures in local credit markets discourage banks from ac-
quiring costly information on opaque borrowers. More direct evidence is provided by
Ogura (2007) who found that, in Japan, the number of competing banks and other mea-
sures of market competition are negatively correlated with the likelihood of lending on a
relational basis which in turn increases credit availability for new rms.
By contrast, Neuberger et al. (2008) found only a weak or insignicant correlation
between market concentration and relationship lending for Swiss small rms, while, con-
sistent with the strategic theory of relationship lending, Memmel et al. (2007) found that,
in Germany, competition in local credit markets is positively associated with relationship
lending and that small banks are more likely to act as a relationship lender.
These studies do not allow for non-monotonic eects of market concentration on
relationship lending. This possibility is analyzed by Elsas (2005) and Degryse and Ongena
(2007). The former considers a sample of 122 large German rms borrowing from ve
major German banks, and considers a bank-rm rapport being relational on the basis of
the banks' self-assessment of the Hausbank status. His ndings indicate the existence of a
U-shaped relationship between the Herndahl-Hirschman index (HHI) of the local credit
market at the registered head oce of a rm (computed in terms of bank branches) and
the likelihood of a relational bank-rm tie. Where the concentration of the credit market
is low, the probability of a bank assuming Hausbank status decreases with a marginal
increase in concentration. By contrast, where markets are very concentrated, a further
increase in HHI raises the probability of a bank being the rm's Hausbank.
Degryse and Ongena (2007) build on the Elsas study, but adopt more objective mea-
sures of bank orientation, which reect the duration and scope of the relationship, and
rely on a much larger dataset of Belgian SMEs borrowing from a large national bank.
Their ndings conrm the U-shaped relationship between market concentration and the
likelihood of bank branches engaging in relationship lending, although the vast majority
of rms in their sample are located in postal zones where the correlation is negative.
Moreover, the non-monotonic eect of market concentration is robust to control for the
presence in the local credit market of banks with multiple contacts across other locations
and for the distance of borrowers from both the lending branch and rival banks.
2.2 How does bank organization aect bank orientation?
Well received theoretical arguments indicate that bank size and organizational design
inuence its lending orientation and asset allocation (soft-information-based versus hard-
information-based activities). The idea is that large and geographically dispersed banks
are highly hierachized institutions, and that hierarchiness is associated with organiza-
tional diseconomies which place these banks at a disadvantage with respect to small,
local banks in lending to information-intensive borrowers on a relational basis (Berger
et al., 1999; Berger and Udell, 2002; Stein, 2002). To the extent that relationship lending
relies heavily on non-codied information, only available to opportunistic loan ocers
at the local level, the use of this lending technology entails serious communication and
5agency problems across the bank organizational layers which may advise large and dis-
tant banks against it (Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Garicano, 2000; Scharfstein and Stein,
2000). On the one hand, a career-conscious loan ocer anticipates that bank managers
at the parent bank are unable to properly appreciate soft information he/she may gain
during the relationship with borrowers and reduces his/her eort in producing it, while
overinvesting in hard and veriable information (Milbourn et al., 2001). On the other
hand, in order to avoid the formation of information rent and mitigate agency problems,
loan ocers are frequently asked to rotate within large banks and are discouraged from
basing lending decisions on soft information (Hertzberg et al., 2010).
Empirical evidence is broadly consistent with such theoretical predictions. A great
number of studies, concerning dierent countries, document that big banks devote to
small business lending a lower share of their resources (Berger and Udell, 1996; Sapienza,
2002; Degryse et al., 2009b) and that, in turn, small rms are more likely to borrow
from small banks (Berger et al., 2005; Uchida et al., 2008). Other studies show that
functionally distant banks tend to pick up informationally transparent rms and are less
prone to assist rms facing nancial distress (Carter and McNulty, 2005; Mian, 2006;
Alessandrini et al., 2008; Canales and Nanda, 2008; Benvenuti et al., 2009; Micucci and
Rossi, 2009). Moreover, small rms located in markets with predominantly functionally
distant banks are more likely to be credit-rationed and less inclined to introduce new
technologies and products (Alessandrini et al., 2009a,b).
A relatively small number of studies focus on the eect of bank size, distance and
ownership structure on the lending technology. Cole et al. (2004) and Scott (2004) found
that large banks in the USA rely heavily on hard information about rm nancial state-
ments in deciding on loan approvals, while small banks base their decisions also on soft
information informally gathered through repeated face-to-face contacts with borrowers.
In this vein, Frame et al. (2001) and Akhavein et al. (2005) reported that large, central-
ized banking organizations are more likely to use automated credit scoring technologies
in small business lending, while Berger et al. (2005) found that small banks are better
at using soft information as they lend at a lower distance and are more likely to employ
personal modes of communication with their borrowers. The role of hierachical distance
in inuencing the importance of soft information in lending approval decisions is docu-
mented by Liberti and Mian (2009). In particular, focusing on the case-study of a large
multinational bank operating in Argentina, they found that the soft-information sensi-
tivity of credit facility is signicantly lower when the credit line is approved at higher
hierarchical levels, geographically distant from the oce that collected information on the
borrower. Finally, Angelini et al. (1998) and Delgado et al. (2007) showed that the bank
lending orientation is inuenced by its ownership structure, as savings and cooperative
banks tend to specialize in small borrowers.
Looking directly at relationship lending, Berger et al. (2005) documented that credit
relationships are longer-lasting and more exclusive when the lending bank is small-sized.
Uchida et al. (2008) validated these results in the Japanese context, by showing that
small banks tend to have closer ties and repeated contacts with their borrowers and lend
at a shorter distance than large banks. Lastly, Angelini et al. (1998), Uzzi (1999) and
Neuberger et al. (2008) found that localism and cooperative ownership is also positively
associated with the relational orientation of banks due to the deeply embedded ties with
the local economy, and the peer nexus between lenders and borrowers.
62.3 How do bank competition and organization intertwine?
If it is true that hierarchical and non-hierarchical banks have a comparative advantage
in transactional and relational lending, respectively, then it is conceivable to expect that
they will react to stronger competition by concentrating eorts and resources on their
favorite lending technology. Therefore, if the local credit market is predominantly pop-
ulated by hierarchical (large and distant) banks, interbank competition and relationship
lending should be observed to be negatively associated. On the contrary, if the organi-
zational structure of the local credit market is made up by non-hierarchical (small, local
and cooperative banks), relationship lending should increase with competition. However,
as far as we know, empirical evidence on the eects of the interplay of bank organiza-
tional structure and interbank competition in determining lending orientation is virtually
lacking. Partial exceptions are Brevoort and Hannan (2004), Canales and Nanda (2008),
Carb o-Valverde et al. (2009), Degryse et al. (2009a) Zarutskie (2010) who provide some
useful indications consistent with the strategic use of bank orientation.
Brevoort and Hannan (2004) documented that the importance of physical proximity
between banks and borrowers located in the US metropolitan areas has increased over the
years 1997 to 2001, immediately after the Interstate Banking and Branching Eciency
Act was passed to remove interstate branching restrictions to banks and bank holdings
and increase interbank competition (Rice and Strahan, 2009). If physical proximity
entails informational proximity, Brevoort and Hannan (2004, p. 25) note, this nding is
\consistent with the notion that as competition increases from lenders located outside the
market, local lenders reallocate resources toward loans in which they enjoy a locational
advantage".
In a similar vein, Degryse et al. (2009a) showed that the more rival banks are hier-
archically organized and the more competitors' branches have real authority, the lower
is the geographical reach of the lending branches and the greater is their orientation to
physically proximate borrowers.
More in line with our empirical approach, Canales and Nanda (2008) investigate how
centralized and decentralized (in terms of branch manager autonomy) banks in Mexico
respond to interbank competition in local credit markets. The results they report indi-
cate that where competition is harsher, decentralized banks tend to reallocate resources
in favor of small and micro enterprises by reducing interest rates and increasing loans to
this category of borrower. Similarly, Carb o-Valverde et al. (2009) found that when local
credit markets are more contestable (i.e. the entrance of new competitors is greater) the
negative impact of competition on credit availability to small businesses decreases. Fi-
nally, Zarutskie (2010) reveals that the deregulation of US banking markets has led banks
to dierentiate by focusing on products and technology for which they are at a compet-
itive advantage over rivals. She found that large banks specialized in hard-information
loans, such as real-estate backed loans, lowering interest rates and extending credit to
more marginal borrowers. By contrast, smaller banks have reacted to deregulation by
increasing the amount of unsecured commercial and personal loans, exploiting their abil-




The analysis is carried out on the eighth and ninth waves of the Survey on Manufactur-
ing Firms (\Indagine sulle Imprese Manifatturiere") published by the Unicredit Group
(formerly Capitalia). The Unicredit surveys collect a large set of information on a rep-
resentative sample (stratied by rm size, industry sector and rm location) of Italian
SMEs with 11{500 employees and the universe of rms with more than 500 employees
over the period 1998-2003. From the original sample of 8,969 rms we exclude a number
of observations for which there are missing values for relevant variables, such as location,
industry and number of employees. We also control for consistency in some answers, es-
pecially concerning the number of banking relationships and the share of banking credit
supplied by the main bank. Finally, we focus on SMEs, so that we drop from the sample
very large rms with more than 500 employees. Thus, we end up with 4,121 observations.
Firm-level data are merged with indicators of credit market structure at the provincial
level measured in the rst year of the survey and calculated using Bank of Italy data on
the number and geographical diusion of bank branches5. Taking the province as the
appropriate size of local credit markets is consistent with recent literature on the Italian
banking system (Herrera and Minetti, 2007; Benfratello et al., 2008; Alessandrini et al.,
2009b), given that, according to the Bank of Italy data, more than 90 percent of credit
granted involves banks and rms located in the same province.
Finally, information on the asset size of banks was taken from Bilbank, a data set
produced by the Italian Association of Bankers (ABI) collecting the balance sheets of
Italian banks, while data on provincial value added and population are drawn from the
National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) database.
3.2 Empirical models and methodology
Relationship lending is a complex phenomenon, dicult to measure. In the empirical
literature it has been proxied by dierent aspects, such as the rms' number of banks,
the length and scope of the relationship, the share of loans supplied by the main bank
and the lender's status of Hausbank.
Unlike Elsas (2005) and Degryse and Ongena (2007), our dataset is at the rm level
and therefore we cannot use the Hausbank status as a measure of relationship lending.
However, referring to the German case, Elsas (2005) showed that the bank's share of
rm's total debt is signicantly associated with the bank being a relationship lender,
that is, with the self-assessment of the bank being a Hausbank, with good access to
exclusive information about the rm and a good capacity to inuence its management.
By contrast, the duration of the bank-rm relationship is not related to the Hausbank
status, while the number of banks seems to negatively aect the availability of information
about the rm.
Therefore, in this paper we measure relationship lending by the share of banking
5Italy is currently divided into 109 provinces, which are grouped into 20 administrative regions.
However, since some provinces were recently constituted, we use the old classication of 95 provinces.
8credit supplied to the rm by its main bank (FINSHARE)6. Moreover, as robustness,
we also build a yes-or-no indicator of banks' relational orientation, RELBANK, that
assumes the value of one if the rm obtains at least one third of bank credit from its
main bank and has credit lines with no more than four banks, and the value of zero
otherwise (see section 5.1)7. Once again, the choice of these cut-o values is based on
the evidence provided by Elsas (2005) who shows that Hausbank borrowers maintain on
average between 4 and 5 lending relationships simultaneously and that the share of total





HHI  ORGMKTSTRCjt;FIRMit;PROVjt) (1)
where subscripts i, j and t indicate respectively the rm, the province where it is ocially
headquartered and the survey year; RELATIONSHIP is, alternatively, FINSHARE
or RELBANK; HHI is the Herndahl-Hirschman index; ORGMKTSTRC are the
market organizational structure variables; FIRM and PROV are rm- and provincial-
level control variables.
Equation (1) is estimated either by a probit estimator, when relationship lending
is measured by the dummy RELBANK, or by using the fractional logit estimator,
when the dependent variable is FINSHARE. In the latter case, since the share of
debt borrowed from the main bank is bounded between zero and one, the OLS linear
regression is unsuitable for the FINSHARE model because it cannot guarantee that
the predicted values lie in the unit interval, like for binary data models. The standard
solution of applying a logistic transformation to the dependent variable presents two
main drawbacks. First, a linear model on the log-odds ratio could be estimated only
when the dependent variables is strictly between zero and one9. Second, once the logistic
transformation is applied, intensive computation is required to calculate E(yjx). An
alternative solution we follow in this paper, which does not require data adjustments
6As a referee has noted, not only banks decide on their orientation towards relationship lending, but
rms do so as well. In this vein, FINSHARE might capture the rm rather than the bank orientation.
While this ambiguity poses interpretation problems, broadly shared across the literature on relationship
lending, in our model the problem of endogeneity is mitigated by the fact that the key independent
variables are at the market level.
7The exact questions posed to rms in the Unicredit Survey were: (i) \Considering the bank debt
equal to 100 at the end of (the last year of the survey), what was the share held by the main bank?";
(ii) \State the number of banks with which the rm had a credit relationship in (the last year of the
survey)" (Capitalia, 2005).
8For banks which declare that they have good access to borrowers' inside information these values are
3.8, for the number of credit lines, and 44.8, for FINSHARE. Given the widespread practice of multiple
lending across Italian rms (Detragiache et al., 2000; Ongena and Smith, 2000), and the distribution of
FINSHARE and the number of lending banks in our specic sample (see Figure 1), we decided to be
a little more conservative by slightly reducing both the cut-os. To check the robustness of our ndings,
we also tried alternative, more and less restrictive, denitions of RELBANK, such as borrowing at least
40 (20) percent of total debt from the main bank and having credit lines with no more than 3 (5) banks,
obtaining qualitatively the same results (available upon request).
9If y = 1 or y = 0, log[y=(1   y)] does not exist, and any procedure to adjust for the extreme values
presents serious problems of approximation.
9and allows for direct estimation of the conditional expectation, is the fractional logit
model proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). The fractional logit model consists in




[1 + exp(Xi^ )]
where Xi is the vector of explanatory variables, including rm-specic characteristics
and banking market indicators. The parameters are estimated maximizing the Bernoulli
log-likelihood function in order to get the consistent Bernoulli quasi-maximum likelihood
estimator ^ 10.
The dependent variables being FINSHARE or RELBANK, for robustness we esti-
mate equation (1) also with the simpler linear model, which, despite the limitations stated
above, has the advantage of allowing for the interpretation of estimated coecients as
marginal eects.
Since our dependent variable is at the rm level, while key explanatory variables (i.e.,
interbank competition and organizational structure of banking systems) are at the market
level, the assumption of independently distributed disturbances is not appropriate. In
particular, under the more realistic assumption that the relationship lending indicator and
the residual are independent across rms but are correlated across observations in the
same province, the OLS standard errors can be proved to be biased downwards (Moulton,
1990; Petersen, 2009). Hence, we correct the variance-covariance matrix by clustering the
standard errors at the provincial level 11.
Finally, we chose to estimate model (1) with pooled data, not exploiting the panel
dimension, for two main reasons. First, the resampling rule followed in the survey provides
that in each survey the panel consists of around one-third of rms from the previous
wave and two-thirds of newly interviewed rms. As a consequence, estimations on an
unbalanced panel would include a very large number of rms present in only one of the
two waves (i.e. number of groups and number of observation would not dier so much),
drastically reducing the degree of freedom of xed eect estimations. Estimations on
a balanced panel built on two waves would be run on a small number observations; in
addition, as rms opt out of the panel in a non-random fashion, estimations would be
biased due to the high degree of panel attrition (Nese and O'Higgins, 2007).
3.3 Variables
3.3.1 Market concentration and organisational structure variables
We use four dierent measures of the structure of local credit markets at the provin-
cial level. The degree of concentration of provincial credit markets is measured by the
standard Herndhal-Hirschman index (HHI) calculated as the sum of the squared share
10For applications of the fractional logit model to rm-level data see, amongst others, Hausman and
Leonard (1997) and Wagner (2001).
11For robustness, we replicated all regressions with robust standard errors for heteroskedasticity ex-
cluding correction for cluster correlation and we found virtually identical results (they are available upon
request).
10of bank branches owned by each bank operating in the province12. Although the HHI
index is not the only possible measure of market concentration, it remains the one most
commonly used by both economists and antitrust regulators all around the world (Ce-
torelli, 1999; Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006), and its adoption allows us to directly compare
our ndings with the existing literature on competition and relationship banking (Elsas,
2005; Degryse and Ongena, 2007). However, the new empirical industrial organization
literature has cast doubts on structural market concentration indexes as a measure of in-
terrm competition and suggests the use of model-based indicators, like the Lerner index
or the Panzar-Rosse H statistic (Panzar and Rosse, 1987; Bresnahan, 1989), which take
into account the observed rms' behavior. Therefore, for robustness we also reproduce
our results using the H-statistic built at the provincial level (see Section 5.3).
The size and organizational structure of credit markets is measured by three dierent
indicators which should capture the propensity of locally-operating banks to engage in
relationship lending:
1. the functional distance of the local banking system from the local borrowers, com-
puted as the number of branches in province weighted by the logarithm of 1
plus the kilometric distance between the province of the branch and the province
where the parent bank is headquartered, over the total of branches in province
(F   DISTANCE)13;
2. the size structure of the local banking system, computed as the ratio of branches
owned by large banks to the total, non-weighted number of branches operating in
each province (LARGE BANKS), where a bank is classied as large if its total
assets are more than 26 billion euros at 2003 prices14;
3. the share of branches held by mutual banks in each province, which is a measure
of the degree of localism and social embeddedness of provincial credit markets
(MUTUAL BANKS).
We build banking system variables using information on the geographical distribution
of branches of all the Italian banks. To partially take into consideration possible issues of
reverse causality, they are calculated in the rst year of each survey15. In 1998, there were
926 banks operating in Italy with a network of 26,301 branches; in 2001 these numbers
12The index is standardized between 0 and 10 in order to have more readable coecients.
13More precisely, the functional distance of the banking system from province j is reckoned as:
F   DISTANCEj =
PBj
b=1[Branchesj;b  ln(1 + KMj;zb)]
PBj
b=1 Branchesj;b
where Bj is the number of banks operating in province j, Branchesj;b is the number of branches belonging
to bank b in province j, and zb is the province where the headquarter of bank b is located (Alessandrini
et al., 2009b).
14This is the ocial denition of large banks adopted by the Bank of Italy. According to the Italian
central banks, major banks have assets of over 60 billion euros, while medium banks have assets of
between 9 and 26 billion euros. For robustness, we construct alternative measures of LARGE BANKS
including also medium banks or limiting the denition to the major banks. See Section 5.2
15We check the robustness of our ndings taking the credit market variables in the year before the
three-year period covered by each survey (results available upon request).
11were 834 and 29,300, respectively. Of these branches, in 1998 (2001), 11,528 (11,951)
belonged to out-of-province banks, 9,295 (11,128) to large banks and 2,800 (3,083) to
mutual banks.
At the aggregate level, we expect the coecients on the interaction terms HHI 
F   DISTANCE and HHILARGE BANKS to be positive. Following the invest-
ment theory of relationship lending, the intuition is that a low interbank competition
is a necessary condition to orientate large and functionally distant banks to lend on a
relational basis. These types of banks have a competitive advantage in oering transac-
tional products with respect to small, local banks, while they are at a disadvantage in
relationship lending (Berger and Udell, 2002). Therefore they nd it rewarding to engage
in relationship lending only if market power allows them to extract additional future rents
from investing resources in building extensive ties with borrowers.
However, by increasing the incidence of small mutual banks with a local vocation and
comparative advantages in using soft information, it is more likely that, at the aggregate
level, competition goes hand-in-hand with more relationship lending (i.e., the coecients
on the interaction terms between HHI and MUTUAL BANKS are expected to be
negative), consistently with the strategic theory of relationship lending (Dell'Ariccia and
Marquez, 2004; Hauswald and Marquez, 2006).
3.3.2 Control variables
In model (1) we include a set of standard rm-specic characteristics and indicators of
provincial economic development. In particular, we control for: (i) rm's age and age
squared, measured by (one plus) the logarithm of the years from its inception (AGE); (ii)
the number of workers employed in the rm, divided into four categories (SIZE); (iii) the
riskiness of the rm, measured by the one-year probability of default as computed by the
RiskCalcTM Italy model developed by Moody's KMV (RISK)16; (iv) the eciency of its
production process, proxied by a dichotomous variable equal to one for rms which have
received the international standard ISO 9000 for quality management systems (ISO9000);
(v) the rm's degree of innovativeness, measured by a dummy variable which is equal
to one for rms that made expenditures on R&D in the three-year period covered by
each survey and zero otherwise (R&D); (vi) the rm's degree of internationalization,
measured by two dummy variables: EXPORT, equal to one when the rm sells part of
its production abroad, and OFFSHORE, equal to one for rms realizing part of their
production abroad.
Then we add the logarithm of the provincial real per capita value added in the rst
year of the survey (V ALUE ADDED) as a control variable at the provincial level.
Since economic and local nancial development has proved to be highly correlated in
Italy (Lucchetti et al., 2001; Guiso et al., 2004a), the introduction of V ALUE ADDED
allows us to identify the true eect of the credit market structure on relationship lending.
Finally, in all regressions we include wave and industry dummies to control for possible
time and industry-specic eects on relationship lending.
16The RiskCalcTM model for one-year risk of default combines rm's nancial statement ratios con-
cerning protability, leverage, debt coverage, growth, liquidity, activity ratios, size (Dwyer et al., 2004).
We thank Toni Riti of Unicredit for kindly providing us with the RISK rating variable.
124 Results
4.1 Descriptive analysis
In Table 1 we report the denition and the sample statistics of the variables used in the
regression analysis, while in Figure 1 we plot the kernel density of FINSHARE and
the sample distribution of the number of rms' banking relationships, on the basis of
which we build the other dependent variable, RELBANK. Both the distributions are
positively skewed. FINSHARE (Panel (a)) has its mode in correspondence of rms
collecting around one third of their total bank debt from the main bank. Only 114 rms
(1.6 percent of the sample) borrow at least 90 percent of credit from the main bank,
while the average (median) share of total debt funded by the main bank is 0.41 (0.35).
Consistently, and in line with the standard evidence on Italy (Ongena and Smith, 2000),
Panel (b) shows that multiple lending is a very frequent phenomenon in our sample, while
single-bank relationships are very uncommon. Less than one percent of surveyed rms
maintain an exclusive relation with a bank, eight percent of rms have credit relationships
with two banks, 40 percent with no more than four banks and 42 percent with more than
ve banks. Finally, the dummy variable RELBANK assumes the value of 1 for 32.2
percent of rms in our sample which, at the same time, collect more than one third of
credit from the main bank and have contacts with no more than four banks.
The univariate relationship between market concentration and the two alternative
measures of relationship lending is clearly non-monotonic. The share of credit supplied
to the rm by its main bank and the likelihood of relationship lending (RELBANK = 1)
is greater for companies headquartered in provinces where local credit markets exhibit a
low or high degree of concentration (Table 2). These dierences are statistically signi-
cant and, as regards the probability of observing relationship lending, also economically
relevant, since RELBANK is equal to 32% in highly competitive markets, decreases to
28 percent as long as concentration increases and than bounces back to 36% in more
concentrated markets. By contrast, the average shares of debt with the main bank across
the HHI distribution are not very dissimilar in magnitude.
Finally, in Table 3 we report correlations between the provincial values of HHI and
of the organizational structure of the local banking system. As expected, the level of
credit market concentration is positively correlated with the presence of out-of-market
banks in the market and negatively correlated with the presence of small, mutual banks
headquartered in the same province. By contrast, local market concentration is not
signicantly correlated with the share of large banks in the province. Although somewhat
surprising, this result is driven by provinces in a single region (Sardinia) where a single
local bank (Banco di Sardegna), not included in the group of large banks, opened and
acquired a large number of branches during the sample period, thereby increasing HHI
and decreasing LARGE BANKS.
4.2 The basic model
In Tables 4 and 5 we report regression results. In Table 4, columns 1 to 5 refer to the
coecients of the fractional logit estimates of equation (1) when the dependent variable
is FINSHARE, while columns 6 to 10 report the average partial eects (APEs) of the
13probit estimates in which the dependent variable is the dummy RELBANK. Given
the problems related to estimating the marginal eects in non-linear models in which
interactions are included, we calculate the correct APE for the interaction terms follow-
ing the procedure outlined by Ai and Norton (2003) and implemented by Norton et al.
(2004). For robustness, in Table 5 we report the OLS coecients of a linear regression of
equation (1) when the dependent variable is, alternatively, FINSHARE (columns 1-5)
and RELBANK (columns 6-10). This set of estimates provides results qualitatively and
quantitatively similar to those presented in Table 4. Thus, in the following we will dis-
cuss separately the eects of control variables and, in greater depth, of the key banking
variables, referring to the two models reported in Table 4.
4.2.1 Control variables
In all specications, regardless of the dependent variable and econometric methodology
we use, coecients on control variables are fairly robust in sign, value and statistical
signicance and hence we can comment on them once and for all.
As we expected, the exclusivity of ties with the main bank signicantly decreases with
the size of the rm as well as with the eciency of the production process (ISO9000),
which could be both considered as proxy of the rm informational transparency. Accord-
ing to the estimates reported in column 1, for very small enterprises (employing between
11 and 20 workers) almost half (45%) of their banking credit is granted by their main
bank, while this share shrinks to about 33% for medium rms employing between 260
and 500 workers. Firms whose production process is ISO 9000 certied have, all else
equal, a value of FINSHARE one percentage point smaller than non-certied rms. By
contrast, AGE and AGE2 are not statistically associated with the share of rm debt held
by the main bank.
Consistent with the descriptive analysis of our sample, companies which invest in
R&D receive a 1.4 percent smaller share of their credit from the main bank17. In the
same way, rms that operate abroad producing (OFFSHORE) or selling (EXPORT)
part of their output raise a lower share of their total debt from their main bank. The
eect is somewhat larger for oshoring rms, for which the decrease in FINSHARE is
equal to 2.5 percentage points, than for exporting rms. A similar negative impact on
the exclusiveness of the bank relationship is produced also by rm's riskiness, even if the
economic eect is quite small: FINSHARE for a risky rm (at the third quartile of the
sample distribution of RISK) is 0.4% smaller than for a safe rm (at the third quartile of
the sample distribution of RISK). These results are partially at odds with predictions of
the literature on relationship lending. Theoretically, more risky, innovative and abroad-
oriented companies should benet most from close bank ties and intertemporal loan
contract design. Moreover, there is evidence showing that relationship lending fosters
rms' innovation adoption (Herrera and Minetti, 2007) and internationalization (De Bonis
et al., 2008). However, our ndings are consistent with the idea that rms that either
engage in R&D or are active in international markets consist predominantly of solid and
transparent rms which are less interested in maintaining exclusive relationships with a
single bank (Bond et al., 2003; Alessandrini et al., 2009a), and with the evidence that
17Firms investing (not investing) in R&D have a value of FINSHARE equal to 38 (42) percent, and
the dierence is statistically signicant at the 1 percent level of condence.
14riskier rms are more likely to maintain a long-lasting and wide-ranging relationship with
their bank (Degryse and Ongena, 2007) and tend to borrow from a greater number of
banks (Cosci and Meliciani, 2002; Guiso and Minetti, 2004).
Finally, as expected, transactional lending is more frequent in richer provinces, where
the soundness of the economic and socio-economic structure increases rms' transparency
(Ferri and Messori, 2000).
4.2.2 Market concentration and organizational structure variables
As regards the variables of interest, in the rst and sixth columns we estimate a simple
model in which, as in Elsas (2005), the only credit market indicator is the Herndahl-
Hirschman index of local credit market concentration, added both linearly and squared
to allow for possible non-monotonicity. Even after controlling for provincial real value
added, we are able to replicate the U-shaped relation between HHI and the strength of
bank-rm ties found by Elsas (2005) and Degryse and Ongena (2007). The coecients on
HHI and HHI2 are jointly signicant and the schedule between market concentration
and relationship lending reaches a minimum at an HHI of 1.37 and 1.52 depending on
measuring relationship lending by, respectively, FINSHARE or RELBANK18. These
gures correspond to the 60th and 75th percentile of the HHI sample distribution and
in any case they are well below the threshold of 1.8 typically used by the antitrust
authorities to identify concentrated markets (Cetorelli, 1999)19. Thus, this preliminary
result is consistent with a credit market in which the strategic and the investment theory
of relationship lending coexist, the former at work in competitive markets and the latter
in concentrated ones.
However, this relationship tends to lose signicance once we control for the organiza-
tional structure of local credit markets (columns 2 and 7). When jointly considered, the
linear and quadratic terms are signicant, but the U-curve has a minimum at HHI = 0:38
in column 2, a value below the rst percentile of the provincial distribution of HHI and
well below the threshold of 1 identifying competitive markets, and at HHI = 0:02 in
column 7. This implies that the relationship between HHI and relationship lending can
be considered as almost strictly positive, supporting the investment theory of relationship
lending. The coecients on F  DISTANCE and MUTUAL BANK have the expected
negative and positive signs but they are generally not signicant, probably because of
multicollinearity. LARGE BANK has a positive and signicant coecient. Although
somewhat surprising, this nding is consistent with the idea that size per se is not su-
cient to explain the banks' preference for lending technologies and that the protability
of lending to small, opaque borrowers on a relational base is strongly aected by the
competitive, institutional and social environments in which large or small banks operate
(Berger and Udell, 2006; Berger et al., 2007).
18Figures are computed setting all other regressors to their unconditional sample means. It is inter-
esting to note that Degryse and Ongena (2007) nd the turning point at a very concentrated market
structure (HHI = 3.7), while the schedule between market concentration and relationship is decreasing
throughout most of the sample distribution.
19Recall that HHI is scaled between 0 and 10, such that the reported variations correspond to the
actual threshold of HHI = 1000 and HHI = 1800 identied by antitrust authorities to discriminate
between competitive, moderately concentrated and concentrated markets.
15The sensitivity of the eects of market concentration on relationship lending to orga-
nizational structure variables clearly indicates that the non-monotonicity of HHI might
hide a dierent sort of heterogeneity due to the type of banks operating locally. Hence,
in columns 3-5 and 8-10 we add the interaction terms between HHI and, alternatively,
the three indicators of market organizational structure. On the whole, our results sug-
gest that a marginal increase in credit market concentration can positively aect the
relational orientation of banks only when the local market is populated by a suciently
large number of branches owned by large and functionally distant banks, which are at a
disadvantage in relationship lending. By contrast, the strong presence of mutual banks,
which largely adopt relationship-based lending technologies, makes concentration inimi-
cal to relationship lending. These ndings reconcile the investment and strategic theory
of relationship lending or, rather, they indicate that close bank-rm ties tend to develop
either where transaction lenders have enough market power to informationally capture
their customers or where relational-based loans can be used as a competitive edge in
markets patrolled by local banks.
Going into details, when we interact HHI with F   DISTANCE, the coecient
on the squared term of market concentration loses statistical signicance in favor of
the interaction term while the coecient on F   DISTANCE assumes statistical sig-
nicance. The fractional logit estimates (column 3) show that in provinces where the
value of F   DISTANCE is above (below) 2.8, a value close to the fourth decile of its
provincial distribution, the eect of market concentration on FINSHARE is positive
(negative). On the contrary, after interacting HHI with MUTUAL BANKS (column
5), the marginal impact of concentration on FINSHARE appears to be positive only in
provinces where the market share of mutual banks is less than 7 percent, which is true
in 41 out of 95 provinces over the sample period, while it proves negative as long as the
degree of localism increases. The estimates of the probit model (columns 8 and 10) pro-
vide qualitatively similar ndings, even if the cuto for MUTUAL BANKS is lowered
to 5 percent, a threshold which still includes around one third of Italian provinces.
Unlike the previous results, the inclusion of the interaction between HHI and the
share of large banks (columns 4 and 9) does not wipe out the statistical signicance of the
quadratic term of market concentration, even if the point estimates provide evidence for
a dierentiated impact of competition on relationship lending according to the presence
of large banks. Considering the fractional logit estimates, in markets where the share of
branches owned by large bank is around 15 per cent (the rst quartile of the provincial
distribution of LARGE BANKS) the convex curve has a minimum in correspondence
of a very high value of HHI (2.16, above the 90 percentile), such that the basic relation
can be considered negative. However, when we consider provinces where the market share
of large banks is suciently high { greater than 46 percent, as in Turin or Rome (where
almost one fourth of rms in our sample operate) { the relationship between concentration
and relationship lending is strictly positive, since the minimum of the curve occurs for a
value of HHI lower than the minimum of its sample distribution. Very similar results
also hold for the probit model.
164.3 The impact of credit market structure on relationship lend-
ing
To gauge the economic impact of the credit market structure on relationship lending, Fig-
ures 2 and 3 display the relation between HHI and FINSHARE, in left-hand diagrams,
and between HHI and RELBANK, in right-hand diagrams, on the basis of coecients
reported in Table 4. Besides being statistically not robust to controlling for the organi-
zational structure of local credit markets, the U-curve in Figure 2 is also slightly convex.
In other words, the economic magnitude of the average eect of HHI on relationship
lending that we nd is small, much more so than that reported by Degryse and Ongena
(2007) for Belgium20.
However, the negligible average impact that interbank competition has on relationship
lending hides signicant, but heterogeneous economic eects. Figure 3 plots the schedules
for HHI taking the organizational structure variables at the rst (the continuous lines)
and third quartile (the dotted lines) of their provincial distribution. As we stated above,
once we take into account the type of locally-operating banks, the U-shaped relation
between HHI and relationship lending tends to vanish and the schedules are increasing
or decreasing depending on the type of banks operating in the relevant market. It is
interesting to note that the two curves in the diagrams tend to cross at values of HHI
close to one, suggesting that the organizational structure of the local banking system
matters either in very competitive or in very concentrated markets.
If we condition the eect of HHI to the functional distance of the banking system
in the province (Figure 3, panels (a) and (b)), a theoretical shift from a competitive
market (HHI = 1) to a concentrated one (HHI = 1:8) lowers the probability of ob-
serving relationship lending by two percentage points, from 30% to 28%, in provinces
where the banking system is functionally close21, while it increases that probability to
37% in provinces where the banking system is functionally distant (a 23% increase in
relative terms). Therefore, the net eect of a shift from competition to concentration on
the likelihood of establishing a bank-rm relationship in two markets characterized by,
respectively, the presence of many functionally close and distant banks is 9 percentage
points. The economic impact of a change in HHI on the intensity of relationship lending
is signicant even considering the actual variations in market concentration in Italian
provinces between 1998 and 2003. For instance, a reduction in HHI of 0.9, as happened
in the province of Enna where banks are functionally distant (F  DISTANCE = 4:42),
is associated with a 8.5% decrease in the probability of relationship lending (from 42%
20Although the dierent denitions of relationship banking used in these studies make any direct
comparisons dicult, dierences in the datasets and relevant markets can help to explain such divergent
ndings. First, Degryse and Ongena (2007) analyze the case of a single national bank likely following a
single orientation strategy in response to stronger competition. By contrast, our dataset is at the rm
level and considers relationships with all possible types of banks (large and small, national and local,
mutual and commercial), each reacting in its own way to changes in interbank competition. Second, the
importance of close bank ties in Italy is lower than in Belgium, as testied by the greater propensity to
multiple banking of Italian rms (Detragiache et al., 2000; Ongena and Smith, 2000). Third, Degryse
and Ongena consider the postal zone as the relevant market, while in our paper the relevant market is
the province which includes a great number of postal zones.
21In relative terms this eect is not much lower than that found by Degryse and Ongena (2007).
Precisely, they nd that an increase of HHI from 1 to 1.8 leads to a 8.6% diminution in the probability
of relationship banking (from 0.69 to 0.63), while we nd that this eect is 6.6%.
17to 33.5%). By contrast, a similar variation in market concentration (-0.7) in a province,
such as Teramo, where the banking system is functionally close, is associated with a 4%
increase in RELBANK (from 22.6% to 26.5%).
These eects are opposite, but smaller in magnitude, when we interact interbank
competition with the presence of mutual banks (Figure 3, panels (e) and (f)). In this case,
as a result of the same shift from a competitive to a concentrated market RELBANK
passes from 30% to 31% in markets where MUTUAL BANKS is equal to 4%, while it
decreases to 27% in provinces where the market share of mutual banks is 15%, with a
net eect on the probability of relationship lending of 4 percentage points.
Finally, a similar aggregate eect is observable when we make the schedules conditional
upon the size of banks in the market (Figure 3, panels (c) and (d)). However, in this
case, this eect results from a small increase (from 29% to 29.6%) in RELBANK where
large banks predominate (LARGE BANKS equal to the third quartile of its provincial
distribution) and from a greater reduction in the probability of relationship lending (from
27% to 23.7%) in markets with a limited presence of large banks.
If we look at the continuous measure of the intensity of relationship banking, FINSHARE,
the magnitude of the economic impact of interbank competition is somewhat smaller, but
qualitatively identical. In provinces where the banking system is functionally close, a the-
oretical shift from the average competitive market (HHI < 1) to the average concentrated
one (HHI > 1:8) lowers the share of credit supplied by the main bank from 40.8 to 39.2
percent. By contrast, the same variation of HHI in provinces whose credit markets are
dominated by functionally distant banks (F   DISTANCE equal to the third quartile
of its provincial distribution) increases the likelihood of strong bank-rm ties from 39.8%
to 43.2%. Similarly, moving from a competitive to a concentrated credit market reduces
the FINSHARE from 40.4 to 39.1 percent in markets with a limited presence of large
banks, while when large banks predominate (LARGE BANKS equal to the third quar-
tile of its provincial distribution), a shift from competition to concentration would be
associated to an increase in the measure of relationship lending from 40.5 to 42 percent.
Finally, in local markets where MUTUAL BANKS is equal to 4% (15%) a shift from
competitive to concentrated markets increases (reduces) FINSHARE from 40.5 (40.7)
to 41.9 (39.6) percent.
5 Robustness
We control the validity of our main ndings undertaking a number of robustness checks.
First, results do not change signicantly across dierent samples and on changing the
set of rm-specic control variables. Namely, we limited our analysis to SMEs with less
than 250 employees and we controlled for the rms' return on assets, volume of sales,
alternative measures of propensity to innovate, juridical status and aliation to interrm
groups and consortia. On the top of that, we addressed more specic concerns regarding
the econometric methodology, the bank organizational variables and the measure of mar-
ket competition. Given that the adoption of FINSHARE and RELBANK provides
qualitatively similar results, in the following we concentrate exclusively on the former as
18a dependent variables22.
5.1 Alternative testing for non-linearities
Throughout the paper we modeled the non-monotonic eect of credit market concentra-
tion on relationship lending by adding a quadratic term for HHI. However, imposing a
quadratic functional form could lead to erroneously accept the hypothesis of a U-shaped
relationship, because the estimated minimum point can be outside the data-range and,
especially, because the signicance of the quadratic term may be driven by a few extreme
values. Therefore, we address these concerns in two alternative ways. Firstly, we adopt a
less parametric approach, estimating a linear spline with one discontinuity point (Marsh
and Cormier, 2002):
Yij = f(HHIj;(HHIj   HHIT)  IT;ORGMKTSTRCj;
FIRMi;PROVj) (2)
where IT is an indicator function such that:
IT = 0 if HHIj < HHIT and IT = 1 if HHIj > HHIT (3)
In order to avoid any arbitrariness we chose the threshold HHIT estimating equation
(2) by OLS with all possible discontinuity points of HHI and retaining the one which
maximizes the overall adjusted R2. Following this approach, we can set HHIT at 0.975,
very close to the antitrust threshold separating competitive and concentrated markets
and somewhat smaller than the minimum of the U-shaped curve estimated in Table 4.
As illustrated by columns 1 and 3 in Table 6, consistent with results from quadratic
specication, in competitive markets, ercer interbank competition is associated with an
increase in relationship banking, while in moderately concentrated and in concentrated
markets interbank competition is associated with lower values of FINSHARE.
Further conrmation of the presence of a U-shaped relationship between market con-
centration and our measure of relationship lending is provided by the estimation of a
fractional polynomial model with two power terms of HHI (Royston and Sauerbrei,
2008). As reported in Table 6 (columns 2 and 4), among the 44 possible combinations,
the best-tting fractional polynomial powers of HHI are -2 and +223. Figure 4 maps
the resulting t and the 95% condence interval, both for the fractional logit (panel
(a)) and for the linear model (panel (b)). The inspection of regression results and the
diagrams clearly conrm the presence and signicance of a U-shaped relation between
market concentration and relationship lending.
22Robustness results are generally similar when RELBANK is taken as dependent variable, but they
are not shown to save space. For the same reasons, in the following robustness tables we do not show
the coecients on the control variables, which are similar to the ones discussed in section
23We also estimated a fractional polynomial of degree three, but the results did not signicantly dier
from those reported with two power terms.
195.2 Alternative measures for credit market variables
Beside bank size and organization, the theoretical and empirical literature has suggested
other characteristics of local credit markets as possible drivers of bank orientation. In
particular, bank interaction across local credit markets would be a factor facilitating coor-
dination amongst rival banks and restraining price undercutting competition (Heggestad
and Rhoades, 1976; Bernheim and Whinston, 1990)24. If this is true, then, following the
rationale of the investment theory of relationship banking, banks may have incentives to
invest in relation-specic assets in order to establish exclusive ties with borrowers (Anand
and Galetovic, 2006).
Recently, Degryse and Ongena (2007) corroborated this theoretical prediction nding
that multiple contacts of banks across markets are positively associated with the prob-
ability of relationship lending. We therefore augmented model (1) with the inclusion
of a provincial measure of multi-market contacts (MMC) that, for reasons of compa-
rability, exactly follows Degryse and Ongena (2007, pp. 408-409)25. MMC is strongly
correlated with market concentration and with the organizational variables: correlation
indexes computed by provinces are 0.56 with HHI, 0.16 with F   DISTANCE, 0.46
with LARGE BANKS and -0.48 with MUTUAL BANKS, all statistically signicant
at the 5 percent level.
For the sake of space, we only report results for the basic specication, without inter-
action terms (Table 7, columns 1 and 4). The eect of of MMC on relationship lending
is not statistically dierent from zero and its inclusion does not aect the other coe-
cients26. Even if in contrast with the evidence discussed by Degryse and Ongena (2007),
this result is consistent with the lack of evidence supporting the multi-market contact
hypothesis in the Italian banking market (De Bonis and Ferrando, 2000).
Further robustness checks concern the denitions of functional distance and size struc-
ture of the local banking system. So far, we have assumed that agency problems inside the
bank organization which makes relationship lending more costly increases with physical
distance between the loan ocer and the headquarter. However, organizational disec-
onomies also depend on the branch-headquarter cultural distance, i.e., on trust, norms
and cultural anities between local loan ocers and bank's managers at the parent bank
(Alessandrini et al., 2008). In this view, we build an alternative measure of functional
distance (F   DISTANCE SC) according to which bank branches are weighted by the
dierence in social capital between the provinces where the branch and its headquarter
24Multi-market contacts may also have pro-competitive eects, because banks may strategically decide
to lend more than the optimal level in one market to reduce competition in others (Mester, 1987) or
because of their funding advantages (Park and Pennacchi, 2009).
25In their turn, Degryse and Ongena follow Evans and Kessides (1994), who suggest calculating MCC
as the sum of all bank pairs in the borrower's credit market (in our case the province) weighted by the
relative frequency of their bilateral contacts in other markets (provinces):
MMCj =
2






where i = 1;:::;B are the banks, j = 1;:::;95 are the provinces, fj is the number of banks operating in
province j, Di;j = 1 if bank i operates in province j, and ak;l =
PB
j=1 Dk;jDl;j.
26This is also true when we include interactions between HHI and bank organizational variables and
even when we consider the interacted term HHI  MMC.
20are located (Alessandrini et al., 2009b)27.
A second renement relates to the bank-asset threshold used to dene the size struc-
ture of the local banking system. In particular, we replicate regressions substituting
LARGE BANKS with MEDIUM BANKS, the share of branches in the province
owned by medium-sized banks, where a bank is classied as medium if its total assets are
more than 9 billion euros at 2003 prices (see above footnote 11).
As shown in Table 7, columns 2-3 and 5-6, estimation results are virtually unchanged
with regard both to the banking and the rm-specic variables. It is worth noting, how-
ever, that the importance of functional distance of the local banking system in promoting
relationship lending and in shaping the eect of market concentration is higher when it
is measured in terms of social capital rather than in terms of kilometers. By contrast,
the eects of the size of the local banking system on relationship lending are found to be
lower when we include medium banks in the size index.
5.3 An alternative measure for market competition
By measuring market rivalry with the Herndhal-Hirschmann index, we have implicitly
espoused a structural approach to competition on the track of the structure-conduct-
performance paradigm. In reaction to the theoretical aws of this paradigm, the so-called
New Empirical Industrial Organization literature has suggested measuring the degree of
competition in the market by looking at the (estimated) behavior of rms. In particular,
a widely used non-structural measure of competition is the H-statistic introduced by
Panzar and Rosse (1987)28.
The H-statistic is the sum of the elasticities of a bank's revenues (R) with respect to








and, on real data, it is calculated by summing the estimated coecients of a log-log
reduced form revenue equation. Under the assumption that the market is in a long-
run equilibrium, Panzar and Rosse (1987) prove that values of the statistic H  0 are
consistent with the case of rms operating as monopolists or under a monopolistic cartel,
values 0 < H < 1 are consistent with the case of monopolistic competition and H = 1
with the case of perfect competition.
In this paper we draw the H-statistic (H   STAT) at the provincial level in 1998
and 2001 from Agostino and Trivieri (2009)29. Then, we build three dummy variables for
27To be precise, social capital is computed as the average voter turnout at the 21 referenda held in
Italy in 1993, 1995 and 2001 as published by the Home Department. The same results hold if we use
the number of blood bags per million population voluntarily donated in each province to the Italian
Association of Blood Donors (AVIS) in 1995 (Guiso et al., 2004b).
28In the banking literature, the H-statistic has been recently employed, amongst others, by Bikker and
Haaf (1998), Claessens and Laeven (2005), and, with regard to Italy, by Agostino and Trivieri (2009)
and Coccorese (2009).
29We thank Mariarosaria Agostino and Francesco Trivieri for sharing their dataset and estimation
procedure generously with us. Refer to their paper for details on the revenue equations at the provincial
level and on the statistical validation of the long-run equilibrium assumption.
21perfectly competitive, imperfectly competitive and monopolistic credit markets, respec-
tively: (i) H STATPC which assumes the value of 1 when we cannot reject the null that
the sum of price elasticities is equal to one; (ii) H   STATMC which assumes the value
of 1 when we reject at 10% level of condence the null hypotheses that the sum of the
estimated price elasticities of revenue is equal to zero (i.e., H   STAT = 0) and equal
to one (i.e., H   STAT = 1); (iii) H   STATM which assumes the value of 1 when we
cannot reject the null that the sum of price elasticities is equal to zero30.
Estimation results are reported in Table 8, where H STATPC is taken as the reference
category. First, the stability of all our ndings relative to control and bank organizational
variables testies that our model of relationship banking is robust to the measure of
interbank competition. Second, the coecients on H   STATMC and H   STATM are
both positive, highly signicant and virtually identical in magnitude (columns 1 and
5). Consistent with the investment theory of relationship lending, this result indicates
that interbank competition reduces the possibility and/or the convenience of establishing
exclusive ties with borrowers and lend on a relational base. However, when we consider
the interplay between competition and the organizational structure of the local banking
system (columns 2-4 and 6-8), we also have clear conrmation that the benecial impact
of bank market power on relationship lending only holds in markets where the presence
of large and functionally distant banks predominates (the interaction terms between the
H   STATM dummy and MUTUAL BANKS has the right negative sign but is not
statistically signicant). On average, the share of credit supplied by the main bank is 2.5
percentage points larger in monopolistic than in competitive markets. This eect vanishes
in local credit markets with a small share (15%) of branches owned by large banks and
where banks are functionally close, while it is twice as large in credit markets with a
dominant share of branches belonging to large banks (46%) or to functionally distant
banks (F   DISTANCE equal to the third quartile of its provincial distribution).
6 Concluding remarks
The current global nancial crisis is aecting the structure of local credit markets, via
government interventions and bank mergers and acquisitions, and it is bringing exclusive
and stable lending relationships with borrowers back to the center of banks' business
models. Relationship-based technologies appear to be of great value both for banks,
which are refocusing their activities on their core business, and for small-medium enter-
prises (SMEs), whose nancial needs are more urgent in times of widespread distress31.
However, deregulation and improvement in communication technologies has also made
credit markets more competitive, the incidence of large and geographically dispersed
banks more pervasive and transactional lending more protable. Is relationship lending
going to survive these changes? How does interbank competition and the organizational
30On the base of the Vesala's (1995) demonstration that the H-statistic is increasing with demand
elasticities, in the few cases in which the F-statistics did not reject both the hypotheses of equality to
one and equality to zero of price elasticities, we considered the provincial credit market as perfectly
competitive, imperfectly competitive or monopolistic according to whether H   STAT < 0:25, 0:25 
H   STAT  0:75, or H   STAT > 0:75.
31On the value of relationship lending on Korean SMEs during the 1997 nancial crisis, see Ferri et al.
(2001).
22structure of local banking systems aect the exclusiveness of bank-rm relationships?
Theoretical predictions on the impact of interbank competition on relationship lending
are contrasting. According to the investment theory of relationship lending, as the credit
market concentration increases, the rms' borrowing options shrink, giving banks the
opportunity to recoup in the course of the lending relationship the specic investments
needed to build extensive ties with a rm. On the other hand, following the strategic
theory of relationship lending, ercer interbank competition drives local lenders to take
advantage of their specic knowledge of local economies as a competitive edge, reorienting
their lending activity towards relational-based loans to small, local rms.
Hence, to establish whether relationship lending can survive competition is essentially
an empirical matter. In two recent papers, Elsas (2005) and Degryse and Ongena (2007)
documented a non-linear U-shaped eect of market concentration on relationship lending
which cannot be easily accommodated with theory. In this paper we show that this non-
monotonicity can be explained by the organizational structure of local credit markets.
Marginal increases in interbank competition are detrimental to relationship lending in
markets where large and out-of-market banks are predominant. On the contrary, where
relational-based lending technologies are already widely in use in the market by a large
group of small mutual banks, an increase in competition may drive banks to further
cultivate their extensive ties with customers.
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29A Tables
Table 1: Denition of variables and sample statistics
Variable Name Variable Denition Mean St.Dev.
Dependent variables
FINSHARE The share of banking credit supplied to the rm by its main bank. 0.406 0.199
Source: Unicredit Surveys.
RELBANK (0,1) = 1 if the rm obtains more than 33 per cent of banking credit from its main 0.322 0.467
bank and has credit lines with no more than four banks. Source: Unicredit
Surveys.
Market organizational structure variables
HHI Summed squares of bank market shares by number of branches in the 1.119 0.493
province (ranging from 0 to 10). Source: Bank of Italy.
F   DISTANCE The ratio of branches weighted by the logarithm of 1 plus the kilometric 2.731 0.876
distance between the province of the branch and that where the parent
bank is headquartered, over total branches in the province. See also
footnote 9. Source: Bank of Italy.
LARGE BANKS The ratio of branches owned by large banks (assets > e26 bn) to the 32.378 16.203
total number of branches operating in each province. Source: Bank of Italy.
MUTUAL BANKS The ratio of branches owned by mutual banks to the total number of 10.148 8.864
branches operating in each province. Source: Bank of Italy.
H   STAT The Panzar-Rosse H-statistic calculated at the provincial level. It is 0.414 0.350
divided into three categories: monopoly (M, H   STAT  0), monopolistic
competition (MC, 0 < H   STAT < 1) and perfect competition (PC,
H   STAT = 1). Source: Agostino and Trivieri (2009).
F   DISTANCE SC The ratio of branches weighted by the logarithm of 1 plus the cultural 0.856 0.451
distance between the province of the branch and that where the parent
bank is headquartered, over total branches in the province. See also
footnote 22. Source: Bank of Italy.
MEDIUM BANKS The ratio of branches owned by medium banks (assets > e9 bn) to the 59.722 19.176
total number of branches operating in each province. Source: Bank of Italy.
MMC A measure of multi-market contacts. See Degryse and Ongena (2007). 0.241 0.127
Source: Bank of Italy.
Control variables
SIZE The number of rm's workers, divided into four categories: 11-20, 21-50, 61.563 75.307
51-250, 251-499 employees. Source: Unicredit Surveys.
RISK The rm's one-year risk of default. Source: RiskCalcTM (Dwyer et al., 2004) 0.013 0.021
AGE The logarithm of 1 plus the years from the rm's inception. Source: 3.079 0.651
Unicredit Surveys.
ISO9000 (0,1) = 1 if the rm is ISO 9000 certied by the International Organization 0.471 0.499
for Standardization. Source: Unicredit Surveys.
R&D (0,1) = 1 if the rm made expenditures on Research and Development in the 0.435 0.496
three-year period covered by each survey. Source: Unicredit Surveys.
OFFSHORE (0,1) = 1 if the rm realizes part of its production abroad. Source: Unicredit 0.046 0.210
Surveys.
EXPORT (0,1) = 1 if the rm sells part of its production abroad. Source: Unicredit 0.717 0.450
Surveys.
V ALUE ADDED the logarithm of the provincial real per capita value added in the year 9.879 0.241
before the survey. Source: ISTAT (National Institute of Statistics).
Notes: Elaboration over the sample drawn from the Eight and Ninth Surveys of Manufacturing Firms (Capitalia, 2005).
The number of observations amounts to 4,121.
30Table 2: Distribution of FINSHARE and RELBANK across HHI
FINSHARE RELBANK Obs.
HHI = 1 quintile 0.405 0.320 1260
HHI = 2 quintile 0.393* 0.281** 1197
HHI = 3 quintile 0.405 0.338 739
HHI = 4 quintile 0.430** 0.364** 571
HHI = 5 quintile 0.419 0.367** 354
Whole sample 0.406 0.322 4,121
Notes: Numbers are obtained considering the sample of 4,121 rms used in the regression analysis. FINSHARE is the
share of bank credit supplied to the rm by its main bank. RELBANK is a dummy variable which identies rms that
borrow more than 33 percent of credit from the main bank and have contacts with no more than four banks. (**) (*)
indicate statistical signicance at the 5% (10%) level of a one-tailed test of the null that the values of the 2-5 quintiles of
FINSHARE and RELBANK are equal to their values at the rst quintile of the HHI provincial distribution over the
period 1998-2003.
Table 3: Pairwise correlation
HHI LARGE BANKS F   DISTANCE MUTUAL BANKS
HHI 1.000
LARGE BANKS -0.039 1.000
F   DISTANCE 0.179* 0.350* 1.000
MUTUAL BANKS -0.312* -0.262* -0.394* 1.000
Notes: Elaboration over the sample of 95 provinces and the sample period 1998-2003. (*) indicates statistical signicance











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32Notes to Table 4: The table reports regression coecients (columns 1-5) and the average partial eects (columns
6-10) and, in brackets, the associated standard errors, clustered at provincial level. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant
at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. In columns 1-5 the dependent variable (FINSHARE) is the share of bank credit supplied
to the rm by its main bank and the model is estimated by fractional logit, using the Stata 10 SE package with GLM
command. In columns 6-10 the dependent variable (RELBANK) is a dummy equal to one if the rm obtains at least one
third of banking credit from its main bank and has credit lines with no more than four banks and the model is estimated by
probit, using the Stata 10 SE package with PROBIT command. The average partial eects reported in columns (6-10) are
computed at sample means using the MARGEFF command, while the marginal eects of the interaction terms (columns
8-10) are computed by the INTEFF command (Norton et al., 2004). In all specications, the variable SIZE is split into
four categories, with the reference category being 11{20 employees. All regressions include industry and time dummies and










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34Notes to Table 5: The table reports regression coecients and, in brackets, the associated standard errors, clustered
at provincial level. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. In columns 1-5 the dependent variable
(FINSHARE) is the share of bank credit supplied to the rm by its main bank. In columns 6-10 the dependent variable
(RELBANK) is a dummy equal to one if the rm obtains at least one third of banking credit from its main bank and has
credit lines with no more than four banks and the model is estimated by probit, using the Stata 10 SE package with PROBIT
command. The model is estimated by OLS, using the Stata 10 SE package with REG command. In all specications,
the variable SIZE is split into four categories, with the reference category being 11{20 employees. All regressions include
industry and time dummies and a constant, not reported for reasons of space.
35Table 6: Alternative testing for non-linearities
Dep. Var.: FINSHARE Fractional Logit Linear Model










Observations 4,121 4,121 4,121 4,121
R2 0.053 0.053
Notes to Table 6: The table reports regression coecients and, in brackets, the associated standard errors, clustered at
provincial level. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. The model is estimated by fractional logit,
using the Stata 10 SE package with GLM command, in columns (1-2) and by OLS, using the Stata 10 SE package with
REG command, in columns (3-4). The fractional polynomial model with two power terms (columns 2 and 4) is estimated
using also the FRACPOLY command. The dependent variable is the share of bank credit supplied to the rm by its main
bank (FINSHARE). HHI<0:975 and HHI>0:975 refer, respectively, to the linear spline for values of HHI below and
above the threshold set at 0.975. All regressions include, as controls, SIZE (split into four categories), AGE, AGE2,
RISK, R&D, ISO9000, OFFSHORE, EXPORT, V ALUE ADDED, industry and time dummies and a constant, not
reported for reasons of space.
36Table 7: Alternative market structure variables
Dep. Var.: FINSHARE Fractional Logit Linear Model
1 2 3 4 5 6
Market structure variables
HHI -0.035 -0.109** -0.141** -0.009 -0.027** -0.035**
[0.065] [0.052] [0.063] [0.016] [0.013] [0.015]
HHI2 0.018** -0.012 0.002 0.005** -0.003 0.000
[0.009] [0.016] [0.015] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004]
MMC -0.087 -0.021
[0.155] [0.037]
F   DISTANCE SC -0.240** -0.058**
[0.094] [0.022]
HHI  F   DISTANCE SC 0.143** 0.035**
[0.056] [0.014]
MEDIUM BANKS -0.002 -0.001
[0.002] [0.000]
HHI  MEDIUM BANKS 0.002* 0.001*
[0.001] [0.000]
Observations 4,121 4,121 4,121 4,121 4,121 4,121
R2 . . 0.052 0.055 0.054
Notes to Table 7: The table reports regression coecients and, in brackets, the associated standard errors, clustered at
provincial level. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. The model is estimated by fractional
logit, using the Stata 10 SE package with GLM command, in columns (1-4) and by OLS, using the Stata 10 SE package
with REG command, in columns (5-8). The dependent variable is the share of bank credit supplied to the rm by its main
bank (FINSHARE). All regressions include, as controls, SIZE (split into four categories), AGE, AGE2, RISK, R&D,
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(b) Sample distribution of the number of banks
Notes: Elaboration over the sample of 4,121 rms. FINSHARE is the share of bank credit supplied to the rm by its
main bank.
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(b) RELBANK, probit
Calculations based on the estimates of Table 4 (columns 1 and 6). In the left hand-side diagram relationship lending is
proxied by the share of bank credit supplied to the rm by its main bank (FINSHARE). In the right hand-side diagram
relationship lending is proxied by a dummy equal to one if the rm obtains at least one third of banking credit from its
main bank and has credit lines with no more than four banks (RELBANK). All the control variables are taken at their
sample mean. The red vertical lines plot the 10 percentile and the 90 percentile of the provincial distribution of HHI
over the sample period 1998-2003.
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MUTUAL BANKS
(f) RELBANK, probit
Notes: Calculations based on the estimates in Table 4 (columns 3-5 and 8-10). In the left hand-side diagrams relationship
lending is proxied by the share of bank credit supplied to the rm by its main bank (FINSHARE). In the right hand-side
diagrams relationship lending is proxied by a dummy equal to one if the rm obtains at least one third of banking credit
from its main bank and has credit lines with no more than four banks (RELBANK). The market structure variables are
taken at the rst (third) quartile of their provincial distribution over the sample period 1998-2003, while the other variables
are taken at their sample mean. The red vertical lines plot the 10 percentile, the median and the 90 percentile of the
provincial distribution of HHI over the sample period 1998-2003.
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(b) Linear model
Notes: Calculations based on the estimates in Table 6 (columns 2 to 4). Diagrams show the t and the 95% condence
interval, adjusted for covariates, resulting from a fractional polynomial model of degree two, estimated by a fractional logit
(panel (a)) and a linear model (panel(b)).
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